A standard C99-based middleware designed on the ANSYS SCADE Display platform, enabling HMI screens to communicate with field-level HIMA HiMatrix F35 safety PLCs via Modbus TCP/IP.

Scope: An integration application operating on the zero-copy principle, developed to establish data exchange between SCADE’s closed-loop structure and the control layer.

Project Portfolio

Current Situation and Problem

Context: The necessity to migrate the interlocking simulation system (4 tracks, 6 signals, 1 switch) at the ITU Railway Systems Laboratory to a SCADE Display-supported HMI architecture compliant with industrial and certifiable standards. Critical Issues: The absence of a native Modbus interface within SCADE Display and the platform’s closed-network design. The inability of the HMI interface to communicate directly with actual field controllers (HIMA HiMatrix F35), and the lack of dynamic field configuration for IP/port maps.

Solution Architecture and Execution

Architectural Approach

Architectural Constraint Assessment: The generated SCADE application used in this setup provided no native Modbus interface. An external C middleware layer was therefore developed to exchange data with the HIMA controller while keeping the HMI logic separate from the communication layer. This is consistent with EN 50128 practice for separating application logic from communication.

A C99 middleware wrapper layer was designed between SCADE’s generated code and the libmodbus library:

Communication Flow

Applied Methodology

• Zero-Copy Integration: Copy overhead was eliminated by hooking directly into the SCADE main loop.
• Dynamic Configuration: A 3-region INI file was used to prevent recompilation requirements during field deployment.

Fallback behaviour: If the configuration file is missing or invalid, the PoC writes a local default configuration for laboratory use. A production implementation should fail safely or require explicit operator confirmation.

• Auto-Reconnection: Connection drops in industrial environments are inevitable; an autonomous auto-reconnect cycle was activated.
• Change Detection: A batch read and selective write strategy was implemented to optimize network traffic.

Architectural Decision: Since HMI hardware’s capability for simultaneous physical command processing is limited, outputs are evaluated in a sequential loop. This structural preference prevents unnecessary fieldbus traffic (network flooding).

• Thread-Safe Logging: Every event in critical systems must be logged securely.

Interlocking Scope

Example route: RT01: SN01E → TC01 → TC04 → TC02 → SN02E (Switch: Normal)

Safety Rule: Based on critical design principles, all signals not explicitly demanded by the system are configured to default to a restrictive state (red).

Results and Operational Takeaways

Quantitative Gain: (Potential values obtained during laboratory PoC tests)

Project Visuals

Related Links

 Source Code: Github/ansys-scade-modbus-integration-middleware 
Download TOK 2025 Paper: SCADE Modbus Paper Turkish (PDF)

Authors: Dora Demir¹, İbrahim Can Kolotoğlu², Muhammet Işık², Serhat Boynukalın³, Mehmet Turan Söylemez²
¹ ITU Electronics and Communication Eng. | ² ITU Control and Automation Eng. | ³ ITU Graduate School

This work was conducted at the ITU EEF Railway Systems Laboratory and published at the Turkish Automatic Control 2025 (TOK 2025) conference.

Can high-security industrial relays be used in interlocking systems? Or are only component-level certified SIL 4 relays permitted? This question points to a widespread conceptual confusion in the sector. The answer is not simply yes or no: Utilization is subject to specific architectural conditions.

Theoretical Background

The Two Worlds of Safety Relays

The selection of relays in railway safety depends on the design philosophy and certification approach. There are two primary categories:

Vital Relays

These relays represent the long-established design approach of railway signaling, rooted in a century of engineering heritage.

Gravity Fail-Safe (e.g., Mors Smitt N.S1):

• When the coil energy is removed, the opening of the contacts is entrusted not to a friction-prone spring force, but directly to gravity.
• A spring can fatigue or snap, but gravity never disappears.
• Therefore, these relays must always be mounted in a specific vertical orientation defined by their design parameters.

Carbon-Silver Contact Technology (e.g., Clearsy RS4):

• One of the contact tips is made of silver, and the mating tip is made of a carbon (graphite) alloy.
• By its metallurgical nature, carbon does not weld to silver; this physically prevents the contacts from fusing.
• Contact welding is rendered physically near-impossible.

Industrial Safety Relays: Forcibly Guided Contacts

Manufactured according to the EN 61810-3 (formerly EN 50205) standard, these relays pursue an entirely different safety strategy. Companies like Dold, Finder, and Arteche have established industry-standard products in this class.

Mechanical Linkage Principle:

• Normally Open (NO) and Normally Closed (NC) contacts are mechanically interlocked via a guiding rod (comb).
• If an NO contact welds due to excessive current or a short circuit, the mechanical rod physically prevents the NC contact from closing and the system from transitioning to an unsafe state.
• As mandated by the standard, a minimum functional gap of 0.5 mm is guaranteed between contacts.

The Critical Difference:

These relays do not prevent the metallurgical occurrence of welding; they merely report the condition to the controller once it happens.

Coil De-energized Contact Pushed by SPRING Force

Contact Welded?

Contact OPENS
(Normal State)

NC Contact Stays OPEN(Mechanical Failure) PLC Detects andLOCKS the SystemNOYES!

VITAL RELAY

Coil De-energized Armature Drops by GRAVITY Carbon-Silver Contact Opens

SAFE STATE

Research Details: Root Cause Analysis

Field Scenario: Relay Selection in Interlocking Panels

An EPC (Engineering, Procurement, and Construction) contractor is selecting relays for an electronic interlocking project. There are two options on the table:

Prices are indicative list-level figures for illustration and vary by volume, region and date.

Cost Discrepancy: The per-unit cost difference in the field is approximately tenfold. The Critical Question: Can Option B be used in the design?

Why Aren’t Industrial Relays SIL 4 Standalone?

Deduction: Industrial safety relays do not possess a SIL rating on their own. They can form part of a system targeting SIL 4 only where the complete architecture — redundancy, readback-based diagnostics, failure assumptions and the resulting safety case — has been assessed against the applicable CENELEC lifecycle and accepted by the independent safety assessor. The 1oo2 plus readback pattern described below is the usual starting point for that architecture, not a substitute for the assessment.

Architectural Solution and Operational Logic

There are two distinct safety architectures in the market. One is predicated on purchasing safety, while the other revolves around constructing it holistically.

Approach A: Component-Level Architecture

Representative: Clearsy RS4 Series

This approach positions the product itself as a certified black box. The relay is a sealed unit designed according to SIL 4 requirements during the hardware design and manufacturing phases, possessing internal redundancy and inherent fail-safe capabilities.

• Operational Principle: The integrator drives the relay using standard industrial relay logic. The product’s safety case documentation is provided directly by the manufacturer.
• Wiring: Only the driving coil and transmission contact terminals are connected. It does not require an external control cable or specialized monitoring software on the safety PLC side.
• Internal Mechanism: The configuration of the mechanism and gravity within the relay inherently eliminates the risk of contact welding.

Commercial Equation:

•  Plug-and-Play: The engineering burden and Independent Safety Assessor (ISA) approval process for the integrator are minimized.
•  Cost: The standalone unit cost is high (~€500).
•  Supply Chain: Creates dependence on a small number of qualified suppliers.

Approach B: System-Level Architecture

Representatives: Arteche, Finder, Dold (Forcibly Guided Relays)

This approach aims to achieve the firm SIL 4 target by combining standard safety relays through an intelligent system architecture. Safety is not embedded in the off-the-shelf product; it is concealed within the entirety of the designed circuit.

• Operational Principle: Instead of using a single relay, at least two relays with forcibly guided contacts are used, electrically wired in series (1oo2 Architecture).
• Wiring and Monitoring:
  • Series Safety: The NO contacts of the dual relay set are wired in series to the field load. Even if one relay effectively welds, the other interrupts the circuit, mitigating the fault efficiently.
  • Readback Process: The closed (NC) contacts of the relays are wired to the digital input (DI) card of the safety PLC, enabling instantaneous monitoring of the relays’ mechanical states.
• Audit Logic: The safety PLC verifies the state of the NC contacts before dispatching a drive command to the field. If a contact appears open while no energy is supplied to the field (indicating a welding syndrome), the system refuses the drive command and locks into a safe state.

Commercial Equation:

•  Cost-Effective: Unit cost is roughly an order of magnitude lower. Project-level savings are smaller, because circuit design, wiring, verification, documentation and assessment effort shift to the integrator.
•  Flexibility: Any EN 61810-3 (EN 50205) compliant standard product can be used.
•  Engineering Burden: Circuit design, wiring complexity, and the ultimate safety proof responsibilities of the final system lie squarely on the shoulders of the integrator architect.

Conclusion

Decision Matrix

Summary Deductions:

• The concept of a “SIL 4 Relay” does not equate to a “SIL 4 System”: A single component may possess a SIL 4 hardware label, but system engineering is a comprehensive, end-to-end endeavor.
• Gravity vs. Spring Force: The safety of vital relays relies on immutable physical laws of nature, whereas industrial safety relays necessitate external diagnostic intelligence to effectively detect latent flaws.
• Cost vs. Responsibility Trade-off: Choosing inexpensive components incurs a high engineering burden and continuous ISA auditing, whereas expensive components yield a comfortable, stress-free integration. The supply chain strategy is directly proportional to a firm’s internal engineering confidence.

References

• EN 61810-3: Electromechanical elementary relays – Relays with forcibly guided contacts
• EN 50129: Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems
• Mors Smitt N.S1 Technical Documentation
• Clearsy RS4 Functional Safety Guidelines
• HIMA SILworX Application Notes

Related Links

 Related Article: → Strategic Analysis: CENELEC SIL 4 Relay Procurement Strategies and Market Dynamics in Railway Signaling

Last update: March 2026 | Version: 1.1